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Abstract
Part I of this Essay sets out why the legal framework in the EU amplifies what are, in reality,
relatively small differences in thinking about resale price maintenance (”RPM”). This amplifi-
cation is primarily due to the fact that the legal system asks economists, in the name of legal
certainty, to draw a false dichotomy between those agreement and practices that are harmful and
those that are beneficial. For practices like naked price-fixing, it is relatively easy for economists
to agree on an answer. It is harder, however, for practices like RPM, which can give rise to serious
anticompetitive harm, but can also prove to be indispensable for important and valuable benefits
to consumers. Part II therefore provides a summary of the economic literature on RPM and em-
phasizes the need for further empirical research in this area. Within the current legal framework,
there is not yet sufficient evidence to justify moving RPM out of the EU’s “presumed illegality”
or “object” box and into a case-by-case assessment of “effect” box. It is clear, however, that this
approach will sometimes presume that some RPM arrangements are illegal when in fact they either
do not restrict competition or, if they do, they are nevertheless justified by generating consumer
benefits. Accordingly, we would have significant reservations about a legal framework that goes
beyond “presumed illegality,” for example making RPM de facto illegal or even per se illegal, as
in the United States before Leegin. On the basis of these beliefs, Part III suggests several small
steps that can be taken towards assessing RPM within a “presumed illegality” framework without
sacrificing too much of the legal certainty that is realized under the current approach. First, we ar-
gue that it is important to ensure that any presumption of illegality is truly rebuttable, and provide
some thoughts as to how this might work. This includes the requirement that the authority should
set out at least one plausible “theory of harm” that is consistent with known facts. Second, we
suggest that a series of screens might usefully be adopted for considering whether there is likely
to be a credible theory of harm in any particular case of RPM, and for prioritizing cases on this
basis. Third we recognize that a prioritization approach may not be as effective in a system such
as the United States, where competition law is primarily enforced via cases brought by private lit-
igants. There may, nevertheless, be some potential to use screens of this sort to help define a legal
standard. Under this approach, failure of the screens would demonstrate that there is no credible
theory of harm associated with a particular case of RPM and the presumption of illegality could
be rebutted. This approach would be similar to the screens that are commonly applied in the EU
in article 102 TFEU (”Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”) (article 82 EC (“Treaty
Establishing the European Community”)) abuse-of-dominance cases.
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RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: EXPLAINING 
THE CONTROVERSY, AND SMALL STEPS 
TOWARDS A MORE NUANCED POLICY 
MATTHEW BENNETT, AMELIA FLETCHER,  
EMANUELE GIOVANNETTI, & DAVID STALLIBRASS * 
INTRODUCTION 
Resale price maintenance (“RPM”) is the practice by which 
a manufacturer directly sets the retail price for which a 
downstream retailer can sell its goods.1 Over recent years, there 
have been important divergences in thinking among economists 
and lawyers about the appropriate treatment of RPM under 
competition law. In the United States, these divergences were 
brought into focus by the Leegin case,2 in which the U.S. Supreme 
Court concluded that RPM should no longer be viewed as per se 
illegal under domestic antitrust law.3 In the European Union 
(“EU”), the debate was precipitated by the European 
Commission’s (“Commission”) review of its vertical restraints 
block exemption and guidance.4 
 
*  All the authors are economists at the United Kingdom (“U.K.”) Office of Fair 
Trading (“OFT”). However, the views expressed in this Essay are their own and not 
necessarily those of the OFT. Emanuele Giovannetti is also Associate Professor, 
Department of Economic Sciences, University of Verona. This Essay was originally 
presented at the 2009 Fordham Corporate Law Institute’s Annual Conference on 
International Antitrust Law and Policy and the Essay is also published in INTERNATIONAL 
ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY: FORDHAM COMPETITION LAW 2009, ch. 19 (Barry Hawk ed., 
2010). 
1. This Essay uses the term resale price maintenance (“RPM”) to encompass both 
fixed-price RPM (in which the manufacturer sets a specific retail price) and minimum 
RPM (in which the manufacturer sets the minimum retail price but allows the retailer to 
set prices above this); both are covered by the arguments made throughout. The Essay is 
not intended to cover maximum RPM, which is typically viewed as unlikely to be 
anticompetitive. 
2. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
3. Id. at 907 (“Vertical price restraints are to be judged under the rule of reason.”). 
4. See Commission Regulation on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union to Categories of Vertical Agreements and 
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Part I of this Essay sets out why the legal framework in the 
EU amplifies what are, in reality, relatively small differences in 
thinking about RPM. This amplification is primarily due to the 
fact that the legal system asks economists, in the name of legal 
certainty, to draw a false dichotomy between those agreements 
and practices that are harmful and those that are beneficial. For 
practices like naked price-fixing, it is relatively easy for 
economists to agree on an answer. It is harder, however, for 
practices like RPM, which can give rise to serious anticompetitive 
harm, but can also prove to be indispensable for important and 
valuable benefits to consumers.  
Part II therefore provides a summary of the economic 
literature on RPM and emphasizes the need for further empirical 
research in this area. Within the current legal framework, there is 
not yet sufficient evidence to justify moving RPM out of the EU’s 
“presumed illegality” or “object” box and into a case-by-case 
assessment or “effect” box. It is clear, however, that this approach 
will sometimes presume that some RPM arrangements are illegal 
when in fact they either do not restrict competition or, if they do, 
they are nevertheless justified by generating consumer benefits. 
Accordingly, we would have significant reservations about a legal 
framework that goes beyond “presumed illegality,” for example 
making RPM de facto illegal or even per se illegal, as in the 
United States before Leegin.5 
On the basis on these beliefs, Part III suggests several small 
steps that can be taken towards assessing RPM within a 
“presumed illegality” framework without sacrificing too much of 
the legal certainty that is realized under the current approach. 
First, we argue that it is important to ensure that any 
presumption of illegality is truly rebuttable, and provide some 
thoughts as to how this might work. This includes the 
 
Concerted Practices, No. 330/2010, 2010 O.J. L 102/1 (reevaluating European Union 
(“EU”) antitrust policy on vertical agreements); Commission Notice, 2010 O.J. C 130/1 
(promulgating new guidelines on vertical restraints). 
5. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), 
overruled by Leegin, 551 U.S. at 907. This rule was based on a restrictive reading of section 
1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States.” Sherman Act § 1, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1 (2006)). 
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requirement that the authority should set out at least one 
plausible “theory of harm” that is consistent with known facts. 
Second, we suggest that a series of screens might usefully be 
adopted for considering whether there is likely to be a credible 
theory of harm in any particular case of RPM, and for prioritizing 
cases on this basis. Third we recognize that a prioritization 
approach may not be as effective in a system such as the United 
States, where competition law is primarily enforced via cases 
brought by private litigants. There may, nevertheless, be some 
potential to use screens of this sort to help define a legal 
standard. Under this approach, failure of the screens would 
demonstrate that there is no credible theory of harm associated 
with a particular case of RPM and the presumption of illegality 
could be rebutted. This approach would be similar to the screens 
that are commonly applied in the EU in article 102 TFEU 
(“Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”) (article 82 
EC (“Treaty Establishing the European Community”)) abuse-of-
dominance cases.6 
These steps require varying degrees of further work, with the 
third being the most controversial and raising the most 
significant issues. However, we believe they all hold the potential 
to substantially ameliorate many current reservations, while 
preserving legal clarity in a position where RPM will, for the most 
part, remain unlawful. Such steps would also have the benefit of 
avoiding cases—arguably, such as Leegin—where there is no clear 
credible theory of harm and thus carry the potential to bring the 
entire competition system into disrepute by making it appear out 
of touch with reality. 
I. LEGAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND: THE ROOT OF 
DISAGREEMENT 
From an economic standpoint, competition law ensures 
competitive markets, which generate benefits for consumers and 
 
6. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
art. 102, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 89 [hereinafter TFEU]; Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 82, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37, at 74–75 
[hereinafter EC Treaty]. 
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drive productivity.7 As such, a key objective of any system of 
competition law should be to prevent firms from engaging in 
practices and signing agreements that appreciably prevent, 
restrict, or distort competition, such that there is detriment to 
consumers that is not counterbalanced by benefits to consumers. 
The language of EU competition law on agreements, article 
101 TFEU (article 81 EC), is in line with this economic thinking. 
The first of the above principle corresponds precisely to article 
101(1) TFEU, which prevents agreements or concerted practices 
that “have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within the internal market.”8 The 
second aspect of the objective outlined above corresponds, more 
approximately, to article 101(3) TFEU, which makes article 
101(1) inapplicable where the agreement or practice in question 
“contributes to improving the production or distribution of 
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while 
allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and 
which does not . . . impose on the undertakings concerned 
restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of 
those objectives.”9 
Difficulties arise, however, in the practical application of 
these provisions. On its face, the law seems to suggest the need to 
review every agreement or practice on a case-by-case basis to 
assess whether there is an anticompetitive object or effect and, if 
so, then determine if the anticompetitive effect is 
counterbalanced by the benefit to consumers. In practice 
however, there is a need for far greater legal certainty than a 
case-by-case analysis can provide. 
The need for greater legal certainty is the result of two key 
factors. First, a case-by-case approach places a high burden on 
firms, who are not in position to carry out this sort of economic 
 
7. E.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 7 (2d ed. 1993); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8–22 (1976). See generally Joseph F. 
Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological 
Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020 (1987) (articulating the efficiency and productivity goals 
of competition law). 
8. TFEU, supra note6, art. 101(1), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 88. Notably, the pre-Lisbon 
Treaty on Establishing the European Community (“EC Treaty”) used the phrase 
“common market” instead of “internal market.” EC Treaty, supra note 6, art. 81(1), 2006 
O.J. C 321 E, at 73 (emphasis added). 
9. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 101(3)(a), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 89. 
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analysis for each and every agreement that they enter. 
Consequently, there is a risk that firms will simply avoid engaging 
in particular agreements or practices, even when they would be 
beneficial. This would clearly be detrimental to both competition 
and economic efficiency. Second, and conversely, a case-by-case 
approach places a high burden on competition authorities and 
private parties that bring antitrust actions, which could lead to 
under-enforcement and therefore insufficient deterrence of 
anticompetitive behavior. These concerns are especially acute for 
less-mature regimes or smaller, under-resourced authorities. 
Again, this would be detrimental to a competitive economy. 
A. Creating Legal Certainty in the Law on Agreements 
For the reasons outlined above, there have been moves—on 
both sides of the Atlantic—to put certain types of agreement and 
practice into particular “boxes,” removing the need for case-by-
case analysis of the likely harmful effects of such practices.10 The 
following figure sets out some of the most common “boxes” that 
have been used, along a spectrum which runs from “definitely 
illegal” to “definitely legal.” 
 
 
Figure 1. Linear representation of artificial “boxes” used by competition authorities to 
assess agreements. 
 
 
10. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) 
(sustaining RPM agreements as per se illegal under the Sherman Act in the United 
States as a matter of law); T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van Bestuur van de 
Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, [2009] 5 C.M.L.R. 1701, 1737–38 (confirming that 
harmful effects may be presumed in “object” cases in the EU because practices therein 
“can be regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of 
normal competition”). It is worth noting that even in object cases parties may adduce 
evidence to meet the exemption criteria under article 101(3), even though the burden 
of proof is on them to prove that the criteria are satisfied. Matra Hachette SA v. 
Commission, Case T-17/93, [1994] E.C.R. II-595, 631, ¶ 104. 
per se 
illegality 
presumed benefit 
(e.g., block 
exemptions)
object presumed lack 
of effect (e.g., 
de minimis)
per se 
legality 
effect 
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“Per se illegality,” on the left hand side of the spectrum, is a 
box used in the United States, but not in the EU.11 Under this 
approach, there is no potential to rebut the presumption of 
anticompetitive harm, nor to show that the agreement has 
efficiency benefits that might counterbalance any harm. Price-
fixing is the classic “per se illegal” agreement.12 Leegin focused on 
whether RPM, which had historically also been “per se illegal,”13 
should be taken out of this box.14 
In the EU, the distinction is instead between “object” and 
“effect” infringements. Practices that are anticompetitive by 
“object” are presumed anticompetitive.15 For these cases, a 
competition authority is not required to provide any real 
economic (or other) evidence of likely anticompetitive harm. It is 
sufficient to demonstrate that the practice fits into the “object” 
box and hence is illegal. However, the “object” box differs from 
the U.S. “per se illegality” box in two ways, at least conceptually. 
First, the presumption of anticompetitive harm, while strong, is 
nevertheless theoretically rebuttable if compelling evidence is 
adduced that the agreement could not have been expected to 
have an anticompetitive effect. Second, an object infringement 
can still, in theory, be exempted from article 101(1) if it meets all 
of the conditions under article 101(3).16 In reality, as will be 
explained in Part III.A, the extent to which the “object” box 
differs from “per se illegality” depends on the extent to which 
competition authorities and courts are open to accepting 
 
11. See Luc Peeperkorn, Resale Price Maintenance and Its Alleged Efficiencies, 4 EUR. 
COMPETITION J. 201, 201-03 (2008) (contrasting the EU system of individualized 
assessment and the U.S. per se approach). It bears note that per se treatment of RPM 
was eventually overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in Leegin. See supra note 3. 
12. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) 
(endorsing a U.S. Court of Appeals holding that “[the Supreme] Court has consistently 
applied the per se rule to [vertical minimum price-fixing] agreements”). 
13. See supra note 5. 
14. Id. (“We [the Supreme Court] granted certiorari to determine whether vertical 
minimum resale price agreements should continue to be treated as per se unlawful.”). 
15. Commission Notice, 2000 O.J. C 291/1, at 3 [hereinafter Guidelines on Vertical 
Restraints] (“[I]n the case of restrictions by object . . . the Commission is not required 
to assess the actual effects on the market.”). 
16. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 101(3)(a), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 89. Specifically, the 
treaty requires that the agreement create efficiency benefits, that a fair share of these 
benefits pass to consumers, that the restrictions are indispensable and that there is no 
elimination of competition. TFEU, supra note 6, art.  01(3)(a), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 89. 
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rebuttal arguments under article 101(1) or efficiency arguments 
under article 101(3). Should such arguments be dismissed 
without due consideration, there would be little in practice to 
differentiate the two approaches. 
At the other end of the spectrum, there are a variety of 
boxes under which an agreement or practice may be judged 
(likely to be) legal. Some practices are simply “per se legal,” on 
the basis of being viewed as unlikely to have an anticompetitive 
object or effect. Other agreements and practices are considered 
so unlikely to restrict competition appreciably that they are 
classed in a “presumed lack of effect” box. The EU de minimis 
doctrine is a good example.17 Likewise, for particular types of 
agreement and particular market share thresholds, it can be 
presumed that, even if there is anticompetitive harm, it is 
counterbalanced by efficiency benefits.18 The various EU block 
exemptions are good examples.19 
These various boxes clearly have the potential to provide a 
fair degree of legal certainty. The appropriate box, if any, for a 
particular agreement or practice will effectively depend on how 
likely it is that the agreement or practice in question would be 
 
17. See Commission Notice, 1997 O.J. C 372/13 (defining the market thresholds 
under which all non-object agreements are presumed lawful). Again, this de minimis 
presumption can theoretically be rebutted. The current market share thresholds, which 
relate to the aggregate market shares held by all of the participating undertakings, are 
five percent for horizontal agreements and ten percent for vertical agreements. Id., 1997 
O.J. C 372/13, at 14. Another good example is the European Commission’s 
(“Commission”) guidance that buying groups are unlikely to be found unlawful if the 
parties to the agreement have a combined market share of below fifteen percent on the 
purchasing market(s) as well as a combined market share of below fifteen percent on 
the selling market(s). See Commission Notice, 2001 O.J. C 3/2, at 19. 
18. Commission Regulation on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to 
Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, No. 2790/1999, pmbl., 1999 
O.J. L 336/21, at 21 (“Experience acquired to date makes it possible to define a category 
of vertical agreements which can be regarded as normally satisfying the conditions laid 
down in Article 81(3) [EC (article 101(3) TFEU)].”). 
19. See Council Regulation on Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain 
Categories of Agreements and Concerted Practices, No. 19/65/EEC, art. 1, 36 J.O. 533 
(1965), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1965–66, at 35 (enabling legislation providing authority to 
declare certain categories of agreements as exempt under article 101(3) TFEU (article 
81(3) EC) by regulation). It is worth noting that block exemptions provide more legal 
certainty than a simple rebuttable presumption. If an agreement is covered by the 
criteria in a block exemption, then the benefit of the block exemption has to be 
explicitly removed before that agreement can be found unlawful. See Commission 
Notice, 2000 O.J. C 291/1, at 17–18. 
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found illegal if a careful, case-specific “effects” analysis were 
carried out. For example, practices such as naked price-fixing are 
regularly expected to be found illegal under a case-by-case 
analysis and, therefore, it is appropriate to put such agreements 
into the “object” (or even “per se illegality”) box. Practices such 
as exclusive distribution by firms without significant market 
power, on the other hand, are regularly expected to be found 
legal under a case-by-case analysis because harm is either unlikely 
or counter-balanced by efficiency benefits and, therefore, it is 
appropriate to place such agreements into the “presumed lack of 
effect” (or even “presumed benefit”) box. 
Agreements that do not fall into any of these boxes continue 
to require a full case-by-case “effects” analysis. The EU does 
provide some further guidance, within its various guidelines, as 
to the circumstances under which it might expect to find 
particular agreements or practices lawful or unlawful.20 Beyond 
this, however, there has been relatively little work done on 
“screens” that might help firms or regulators in deciding 
whether a particular agreement is lawful or unlawful under an 
“effects” analysis. 
B. Comparison with Article 102 TFEU 
It is interesting to contrast this situation with article 102 
TFEU (article 82 EC),21 the EU law relating to abuse of a 
dominant position. Under article 102, practices are not 
compartmentalized into “boxes” in quite the same way as article 
101. There is no general doctrine that certain conduct is by its 
very nature regarded as being injurious to the proper 
functioning of normal competition.22 Indeed, it could be argued 
that all article 102 practices are assessed on an “‘effect’” basis. 
However within this “‘effect’” category, the approach taken is 
fairly nuanced. The courts and the Commission have, over time, 
 
20. See Commission Notice, 2000 O.J. C 291/1, at 17–18. 
21. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 102, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 89; EC Treaty, supra note 6, 
art. 82, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 74–75. 
22. See James S. Venit, Article 82: The Last Frontier—Fighting Fire with Fire?, 28 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1157, 1166–67 (2005) (“[W]hereas [a “box”] approach may be 
justified by the express reference in Article 81 to the ‘object or effect,’ of a restrictive 
agreement, there is no textual basis for such an approach under Article 82 which is why 
the case law requires an analysis of effects.”). 
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established “screens” that help determine both whether the 
practice can be presumed pro- or anticompetitive, and what 
proof is needed to change this presumption.23 For example, firms 
have no duty to deal (that is, refusing to supply a new customer is 
presumed a valid practice) unless there exist certain “exceptional 
circumstances,” specifically that the product is indispensable for 
competition, the refusal eliminates competition, and there is no 
clear objective justification.24 
Another contrast with article 102 is also worth discussing. In 
theory, an agreement or practice which falls within the “effect” 
box under article 101 is not presumed lawful or unlawful, absent 
a full effects analysis. Nevertheless, it is, our opinion, based on 
our experience of working at an enforcing agency, that practices 
or agreements which fall into the “effect” box are often viewed as 
roughly legal. At the very least, there seems to be an expectation 
among firms that the competition authority or private plaintiff 
will face an uphill struggle in proving why an agreement or 
practice is likely to be anticompetitive under a full “effects” 
analysis and should therefore be found illegal. If so, it would be 
unsurprising for firms to make the calculated decision to accept 
the risk of litigation and engage in the behavior.25 
Under article 102, by contrast, there is certainly no 
presumption that all behavior of dominant firms is roughly 
 
23. See, e.g., Manufacture Française de Pneumatiques Michelin v. Commission, 
Case T-203/01, [2003] E.C.R. II-4071, ¶ 56 (holding that loyalty rebates are 
presumptively illegal); AZKO Chemie BV v. Commission, Case C-62/86, [1991] E.C.R. I-
3359, ¶ 71 (holding that predatory pricing is presumptively illegal when below average 
variable costs). 
24. Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und 
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-7/97, [1998] E.C.R. I-7791. It is worth 
noting that the Commission’s recent guidance on enforcement priorities under article 
102 provides additional screens—in particular price-cost-based screens—which arguably 
go beyond current case precedent. See Commission Communication, 2009 O.J. C 45/7. 
However, these are, at least theoretically, intended to set enforcement priorities rather 
than legal standards. See id., 2009 O.J. C 45/7. 
25. In reality, the extent to which this last point concern is valid is linked to the 
standard of proof required by courts in order to show anticompetitive effect. If this 
standard of proof is set too high, then it will be more rational for firms to engage in 
anticompetitive behavior, since the risk of effective litigation is low. This suggests less 
difference between the “effect” box and “per se legality” than might have been 
expected. Such a situation arguably in turn increases the pressure to put into the 
“object” box agreements and practices which are fairly, but perhaps not very, likely to be 
harmful. 
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lawful, absent an examination of the “screens.” This perception 
has been reinforced by the extremely high fines imposed by the 
Commission in recent abuse cases.26 
C. Implications for RPM 
Based on the above, the key question from a legal 
perspective is whether it is appropriate to put RPM in any of the 
boxes above. To assess this, the core question would seem to be: 
how often would RPM, if assessed on a case-by-case basis, be 
found illegal (that is, anticompetitive and without countervailing 
efficiency benefits)? If the answer is “usually” or “very often,” 
then the approach described above suggests that RPM should fall 
within the “object” box. 
Unfortunately, economists dread this core question because 
they find it exceptionally hard to answer. As discussed below, the 
difficulty is that, from an economic perspective, RPM sits rather 
awkwardly on the spectrum displayed in figure 1. There is no 
doubt that it can be anticompetitive. But it can also give rise to 
important consumer benefits and, in some cases, will be 
indispensable for achieving those consumer benefits. Many 
economists would agree that RPM is, if anything, slightly closer to 
the left hand side of the above figure than the right hand side.27 
But we believe that most economists would agree that it does not 
squarely sit on the left hand side with naked price-fixing or bid-
rigging and, moreover, its precise position in any given case will 
depend on market circumstances. 
 
26. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. COMP/C-3/37.990, slip op. (Eur. Comm’n 
May 13, 2009), cited in 2009 O.J. C 227/13 (Intel) (fining Intel €1.6 billion); Commission 
Decision No. COMP/C-3/37.792, 2007 O.J. L 32/23, at 28 (Microsoft) (fining Microsoft 
€497,196,304). 
27. See Frank Mathewson & Ralph Winter, The Law and Economics of Resale Price 
Maintenance, 13 REV. OF INDUS. ORG. 57, 81–82 (1998) (“At the policy level, it is our 
view, shared with others, that economic efficiency is best served if resale price 
maintenance is judged according to a rule of reason or a per se legality standard.”); see 
also Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints: 
Empirical Evidence and Public Policy, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 391 (Paolo 
Buccirossi ed., 2008) (“[V]ertical restraints in manufacturer/retailer settings are 
publically desirable when privately desirable, and thus government intervention is not 
warranted in those situations. This is not to say that the use of VR should never be 
questioned, but the presumption should not be that they are detrimental to 
consumers . . . .”). 
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Faced with the alternatives that RPM is mostly harmful or 
mostly beneficial, some economists (ourselves included) will 
gravitate towards the left side of the spectrum and settle for RPM 
to be an “object” infringement. Others cannot accept the fact 
that this approach has the implication of presuming unlawful, on 
the one hand, agreements that could not possibly have an 
anticompetitive effect and, on the other hand, agreements that 
have real efficiency benefits. These economists settle for RPM to 
be an “effect” infringement. 
What is interesting is that there is not necessarily a great 
deal of difference between the views of these two sets of 
economists. Rather, they are making different choices from what 
seems—from an economic perspective—to be an unappetizing 
menu of options. Relatively small differences in view are 
therefore amplified by the legal framework with which 
economists are presented. 
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMICS OF RPM 
Part II looks further at the economics of RPM, including the 
possible benefits from RPM, the possible theories of harm, and 
why economists find the choice described above so difficult. 
A. Efficiency Benefits of RPM 
There is a large amount of literature on RPM,28 but the 
literature on the efficiency benefits of RPM is, for the most part, 
older and more well-established than that on its anticompetitive 
effects. There are essentially three broad economic arguments in 
support of RPM. 
The first, which formed the basis of the submissions of the 
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission in the 
Leegin case,29 is that while RPM reduces intra-brand price 
competition, it can promote interbrand competition by 
 
28. See generally, e.g., Emanuele Giovannetti and David Stallibrass, Three Cases in 
Search of a Theory: Resale Price Maintenance in the UK, 5 EUR. COMPETITION J. 641 (2009) 
(analyzing the anticompetitive effects of resale price maintenance); Peeperkorn, supra 
note 11 (analyzing the efficiency effects of resale price maintenance). 
29. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10–12, 
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480). 
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providing quality certification30 or reducing free riding at the 
distribution level on aspects such as service provision.31 The idea 
here is straightforward: Where retailers carry out some form of 
service on behalf of manufacturers that involves the retailers 
incurring a cost, there is a risk, absent RPM, that retailers whom 
do not provide the service could cut prices and win business away 
from retailers that do. A typical concern might be a customer 
spending time in the testing room of a high-end shop, 
comparing a variety of speakers, and then buying the speakers 
elsewhere from the cheapest outlet. If this occurs, then clearly 
the retailers’ incentives to provide these services will be reduced, 
which is bad for both the manufacturer and consumers.32 
The second argument relates to the “indispensability” 
question involved in assessing efficiency benefits under article 
101(3) TFEU (article 81(3) EC).33 While other vertical restraints 
can achieve some of the same benefits as RPM, there will be 
circumstances (for example, the presence of risk aversion) in 
which RPM is more effective than these other restraints. An 
intuitive example might be a supplier of a branded product who 
primarily sells through a specialist bricks-and-mortar retail 
network that is approached by an internet retailer. The supplier 
is concerned that if he supplies the internet retailer, absent RPM, 
then the internet retailer could price low and damage the 
 
30. See Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, Resale Price Maintenance and 
Quality Certification, 15 RAND J. ECON. 346, 358 (1984). 
31. See Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 
86, 104 (1960). 
32. See Peeperkorn, supra note 11, at 208 (explaining the claim that resale price 
maintenance reduces free riding by distributors). The quality certification literature is 
essentially the same, but the “service” that the retailer provides is a form of “quality 
certification” service. See Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 30, at 347 (proposing a model 
in which a retailer provides a service by “ascertaining the quality or stylishness of 
commodities” for the consumer). When a reputable retailer stocks a given product they 
implicitly guarantee the quality of that product in the eyes of consumers. By way of 
example, a department store that stocks a particular perfume raises the brand profile of 
that perfume. There is a cost involved in running a department store, however, so if all 
customers just go and buy the perfume more inexpensively elsewhere, the department 
store will not be able to survive. This will in turn not only remove a valued outlet for 
customers but also an important quality certification mechanism for suppliers. In 
practice, of course, the department store is more likely simply to refuse to stock any 
perfume for which this is likely to happen. 
33. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 101(3)(a), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 89; EC Treaty, supra 
note 6, art. 81(3)(a), 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 74. 
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viability of the bricks-and-mortar network. The supplier can 
either (1) refuse to supply the internet retailer, by excluding the 
retailer from his (legal) selective distribution system, or (2) agree 
to supply him on an RPM basis. If, as here, the alternative to RPM 
is not to supply at all, then RPM may in fact be the more efficient 
and procompetitive option. 
The third argument is based on the standard Chicago 
school argument that, in any given market, there is only one 
monopoly profit.34 An upstream monopolist has no ability to 
increase its profits through RPM, since it should in any case be 
able to extract the full monopoly market rent through its 
wholesale pricing structure (at least so long as nonlinear pricing 
is possible). As such, the argument runs, RPM cannot be welfare-
reducing and, if it is undertaken, should be assumed beneficial.35 
B. Anticompetitive Effects of RPM 
While the literature setting out procompetitive rationales for 
RPM has existed for some time, the anticompetitive literature is 
relatively more recent and still developing. Part II.B classifies the 
literature under five general theories of harm.36 
The first theory of harm relates to RPM as a facilitating 
practice to sustain upstream collusion, which relates to inter-
brand competition. When upstream firms wish to collude, and 
concomitantly negotiate contracts with wholesalers or retailers in 
 
34. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A 
Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 15 (2008). For more information about 
the interface of Chicago-school economics and antitrust law, see generally POSNER, supra 
note 7. 
35. See, e.g., Thomas M. Melsheimer, Economics and Ideology: Antitrust in the 1980s, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 1319, 1330–31 (1990) (“[M]any vertical restrictions, such as resale price 
maintenance, might have efficiency-enhancing, procompetitive effects.”). It should be 
highlighted that the elimination of double marginalization is not a good argument for 
the imposition of RPM, since it is in fact solved by maximum RPM, which is typically 
legal. See Roger D. Blair & Francis Lafontaine, Analysis of Maximum Resale Price 
Maintenance, 18 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 25, 25 (1999) (“For all intents and purposes, 
[Supreme Court precedent] permits maximum resale price restraints.”) (citing State Oil 
Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997)); Benjamin Klein, Distribution Restrictions Operate by 
Creating Dealer Profits: Explaining the Use of Resale Price Maintenance in State Oil v. Khan, 7 
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 48 (1999) (stating that a manufacturer may use maximum resale 
price maintenance to control double marginalization). 
36. Each of these effects is robust to the Chicago critique described above. See supra 
note 34 and accompanying text. 
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private, it can be difficult for any collusive agreement to be 
monitored; rival wholesale prices cannot be monitored and 
enforced, and retail prices are an imperfect proxy. Jullien and 
Rey have shown that, in this context, upstream firms can use 
RPM as a facilitating practice for collusion since it brings the 
publicly observable element of price under their control.37 
The second theory of harm relates to RPM as a facilitating 
practice to sustain downstream collusion. This can occur where 
downstream firms wish to engage in collusion. They can use the 
imposition of multiple RPM agreements by an upstream firm 
(acting as a “common agent”) to facilitate downstream price 
collusion. The enforcement of RPM can facilitate agreement on 
prices, monitoring of prices, and even punishment for breaching 
the collusive agreement. In some instances, the RPM is effectively 
no more than a “sham” vertical agreement, masking a purely 
horizontal agreement.38 
The third theory of harm relates to the use of RPM as a 
commitment device to protect upstream monopoly rents. This 
relates to a well-known monopoly commitment problem, 
originally identified by Hart and Tirole.39 A monopolist 
maximizes its profit by selling the right to distribute to only one 
downstream player. However, ex post it has an incentive to break 
this agreement and sell to additional downstream players. The 
overall effect is that, absent a commitment device, the upstream 
firm is unable to extract the full rent associated with its market 
power, because it cannot commit itself to not cutting prices on 
later contracts. RPM can solve this problem, by allowing the 
 
37. Bruno Jullien & Patrick Rey, Resale Price Maintenance and Collusion, 38 RAND J. 
ECON. 983, 996 (2007). 
38. See, e.g., Argos Ltd. v. Office of Fair Trading [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1318, [141], 
[2006] U.K.C.L.R. 1135 (Eng.) (holding that “if (i) retailer A discloses to supplier B its 
future pricing intentions in circumstances where A may be taken to intend that B will 
make use of that information to influence market conditions by passing that 
information to other retailers (of whom C is or may be one), (ii) B does, in fact, pass 
that information to C in circumstances where C may be taken to know the circumstances 
in which the information was disclosed by A to B and (iii) C does, in fact, use the 
information in determining its own future pricing intentions, then A, B and C are all to 
be regarded as parties to a concerted practice having as its object the restriction or 
distortion of competition.”). 
39. Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure, 
1990 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 205, 208 (describing the monopoly 
commitment problem in a Cournot setting). 
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upstream firm to commit to the monopoly price and extract its 
full monopoly rents. This theory has also been shown under 
different assumptions by O’Brien and Shaffer,40 and Rey and 
Vergé.41 
The fourth theory of harm relates to the use of RPM as a 
means either to soften downstream competition or deter 
downstream entry. Shaffer has shown that downstream firms may 
have a unilateral incentive to ask the upstream firm to implement 
RPM as a means to soften competition between themselves.42 
More generally, RPM can benefit downstream firms by making it 
harder for cut-price entrants to steal business by undercutting 
competitors. Such entrants can still make additional profits 
through greater efficiencies, but they cannot use these 
efficiencies to steal business through lower prices.43 
The final theory relates to the use of RPM as a means to 
dampen system competition through networks of interlocking 
RPM agreements. The simplest example would be a market 
where there is a duopoly of manufacturers upstream and a 
duopoly of retailers downstream and both retailers carry the 
products of both manufacturers—a situation defined as “double 
common agency.” Dobson and Waterson have shown that in a 
bargaining framework, RPM can reduce retailers’ incentives to 
negotiate on wholesale prices by preventing downstream 
undercutting.44 This, in turn, dampens upstream competition 
 
40. Daniel P. O’Brien & Greg Shaffer, Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts, 
23 RAND J. ECON. 299, 305–06 (1992) (discussing resale price maintenance and the 
commitment problem in a differentiated product market). 
41. Patrick Rey & Thibaud Vergé, Bilateral Control with Vertical Contracts, 35 RAND J. 
ECON. 728, 740 (2004) (confirming the findings of O’Brien and Shaffer). 
42. Greg Shaffer, Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of 
Facilitating Practices, 22 RAND J. ECON. 120, 130 (1991) (describing the potential benefits 
of resale price maintenance to a downstream firm). 
43. See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, AN EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT UPON 
PRODUCTIVITY OF ENDING RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE ON BOOKS (2008) (U.K.), 
available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/economic_research/oft981.pdf; Stephen 
Davies et al., The Benefits from Competition: Some Illustrative UK Cases 31–46 (Dep’t of 
Trade and Indus. Economic Paper No. 9, 2004) (U.K.) (describing the impact of resale 
price maintenance in the British book market). 
44. Paul W. Dobson & Michael Waterson, The Competition Effect of Industry-Wide 
Vertical Price Fixing in Bilateral Oligopoly, 25 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 935, 953–54 (2007) (“In 
the present context, firms facing the prospect of intense retail rivalry destroying profits 
for all industry members will have a joint interest in avoiding such destructive 
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and creates higher retail prices, to the detriment of consumers.45 
More generally, Rey and Vergé have shown that RPM can 
potentially eliminate “any effective competition—at the 
interbrand level as well as at the intrabrand level—and yield 
instead the monopoly outcome” if used jointly with franchise 
fees.46 
C. The Dreaded Question: How Often is RPM Likely to be Harmful on 
Balance? 
Given that there is the potential for both anticompetitive 
harm and efficiency benefits from RPM, which of these is most 
likely to be dominant? Put another way, how likely are these 
theories of harm, and how significant are the efficiencies likely to 
be? 
It is worth noting that there is not particularly strong 
empirical literature regarding RPM. Lafontaine and Slade 
provide the most recent summary of the existing empirical 
evidence on RPM.47 Within a broader analysis of vertical 
restraints, they identify three empirical research papers looking 
at RPM.48 One of these papers examined cases where RPM was 
imposed by government,49 while two of them examined cases in 
which RPM was imposed by firms.50 Lafontaine and Slade 
conclude that self-imposed RPM cases have an overall positive 
 
competition. An industry-wide move to RPM or exclusivity would be a way of avoiding 
this outcome when it allows for higher combined profits.”). 
45. Id. at 954 (“[RPM] would be against consumer interests. A move to RPM would 
maintain the same level of variety in the market, but lead to higher prices.”). 
46. Patrick Rey & Thibaud Vergé, Resale Price Maintenance and Horizontal Cartel 4 
(Ctr. for Mkt. & Pub. Org. Working Paper No. 02/047, 2004). 
47. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints: 
Empirical Evidence and Public Policy, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 391 (Paolo 
Buccirossi ed., 2008). 
48. Id. at 406 tbl.10.2, 407 tbl.10.3 (citing Thomas W. Gilligan, The Competitive 
Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 17 RAND J. ECON. 544 (1986); Pauline M. Ippolito & 
Thomas R. Overstreet, Resale Price Maintenance: An Economic Assessment of the Federal 
Trade Commission’s Case Against the Corning Glass Works, 39 J.L. & ECON. 285 (1996); 
Stanley I. Ornstein & Dominique M. Hanssens, Resale Price Maintenance: Output Increasing 
or Restricting? The Case of Distilled Spirits in the United States, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 1 (1987)). 
49. Id. 407 tbl.10.3 (classifying Ornstein and Hanssen’s study as an “[e]mpirical 
assessment of effects of mandated vertical restraints”) (emphasis added). 
50. Id. at 406 tbl.10.2 (classifying both Gilligan’s and Ippolito and Overstreet’s 
studies as “[e]mpirical assessment[s] of effects of voluntary vertical restraints”) 
(emphasis added). 
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impact, while the exogenously imposed ones have a negative 
impact.51 However, the authors themselves caution against 
drawing strong policy conclusions given the limited quantity and 
quality of the empirical work.52 
An examination of actual cases can be misleading, too, since 
these cases are selected by the competition authorities. That said, 
the U.K. Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) has intervened against 
RPM on a number of occasions, and in each case the evidence 
supported the view that the RPM in question was anticompetitive 
and not outweighed by efficiency benefits. For example, two 
recent OFT infringement decisions were closely interlinked with 
theories of coordination, although it was not always explicitly 
stated within the decision.53 
On the benefit side, the OFT commissioned research on the 
impact of the removal of RPM in the retail book market, which 
was previously regulated by the “Net Book Agreement.”54 This 
agreement, which was in place from 1901 until 1997, allowed 
publishers to set the retail prices of books.55 In 1962, when the 
agreement was given legal sanction under the Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act,56 many efficiency arguments were made as to how 
removal of this longstanding agreement would damage the 
market for books.57 The agreement was disbanded in 1995, 
 
51. Id. at 408. 
52. Id. at 407–08 (discussing the limitations of the data examined). 
53. See Decision of the Office of Fair Trading, Price Fixing of Replica Football Kit, 
No. CA98/06/2003 (August 1, 2003), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/
ca98_public_register/decisions/replicakits.pdf [hereinafter Replica Football Kit]; 
Decision of the Office of Fair Trading, Agreements between Hasbro U.K. Litd., Argos 
Ltd. and Littlewoods Ltd. Fixing the Price of Hasbro Toys and Games, No. 
CA98/8/2003 (November 21, 2003), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/
ca98_public_register/decisions/hasbro3.pdf [hereinafter Hasbro]. For a discussion of 
these two cases, see Giovannetti & Stallibrass, supra note 28, at 649–52. 
54. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 43. 
55. See Davies et al., supra note 43, at 31 (“[The Net Book Agreement] was used to 
artificially constrain the retail price of book [sic], by preventing any bookseller from 
selling a book under the publisher’s chosen (net) price, without facing a publisher-wide 
refusal to supply future books.”); Sharon Billington, Note, Relief from Online Used Book 
Sales During New Book Launches, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 497, 520 n.139 (2006) (noting 
the duration of the Net Book Agreement). 
56. Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68. 
57. See Davies et al., supra note 43, at 32 (“In 1962 the Restrictive Practices Court 
considered the illegality of the NBA [Net Book Agreement], and contrary to initial 
intuition, its judgement [sic] exempted the NBA, allowing it to continue. In the 
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following pressure from the competition authorities.58 In 
practice, and contrary to expectations, the research found that 
total sales volumes for books increased, as did the number of 
titles published.59 There was also a significant increase in retail 
diversity, with the growth of new retail formats facilitated by their 
ability to offer discounted books.60 The U.K. situation also 
compared positively with Germany, where RPM was maintained.61 
On balance, it is far from obvious which way the scales tip on 
RPM. As the academic literature acknowledges, the body of 
research is simply not large enough to suggest strong conclusions 
either way. More empirical evidence would be invaluable.62 
However, on the basis of the evidence available to date, and if we 
had to make a binary choice between object and effect, we 
believe that there is simply not enough evidence to conclude that 
RPM should be moved from the “object” category into the 
“effect” box. Two main factors tip us towards this view. 
The first is the role of RPM in facilitating coordination, a 
role that other vertical restraints do not seem to have. We believe 
this is not just a minor theoretical point, as illustrated by the 
recent OFT infringement cases described above.63 
The second factor is the fact that many of the benefits 
provided by RPM may also, at least in theory, be secured by other 
vertical restraints. While there are some cases (for example, risk 
aversion) in which RPM may be more efficient than other types 
of restraints, it is unclear how frequently these situations occur in 
practice. 
 
judegment [sic], Mr. Justice Buckley famously emphasized that ‘Books are different’, 
and considered the NBA to be in society’s interest.”) 
58. See id. at 32 (“Eventually, the pressures became too strong and the Publishers’ 
Association disbanded the NBA, making it effectively inoperable for publishers, in 
September 1995.”). 
59. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 43, at 42 figs.6.1–6.2 (showing the increase 
in the volume of books sold in the U.K. from 1995–2006 and showing the increase in the 
number of titles published in the U.K. from 1990–2005, respectively). 
60. Id. at 43 tbl.6.1 (showing the rise of grocery stores, mail-order suppliers, and 
the Internet at the expense of independent bookstores). 
61. See id. at 76–89 (comparing the results from Germany and the United 
Kingdom). 
62. See Lafontaine & Slade, supra note 47, at 409 (“[M]uch more empirical 
evidence is needed before we can draw more definitive conclusions . . . .”). 
63. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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III. SMALL STEPS TOWARDS A MORE NUANCED POLICY? 
Given the legal framework described in Part I, we on 
balance support the retention of RPM within the “object” box. 
However, the preceding discussion illustrates some reservations 
about a legal framework that, in the name of legal certainty, 
presumes as illegal agreements and practices that either do not 
restrict competition or that would nevertheless be justified by the 
efficiency benefits they may generate. This issue is particularly 
relevant to the case of RPM. 
Part III sets out a few small steps that might be taken towards 
a slightly more nuanced approach to assessing RPM. These would 
substantially ameliorate our current reservations, while 
preserving a position where RPM will, for the most part, remain 
unlawful. 
A. Ensuring that the Presumption of Illegality is Truly Rebuttable 
Our first proposal towards a more nuanced approach is 
relatively straightforward and uncontentious: widen the gap 
between the EU “object” box and the U.S. “per se illegality” box. 
Under the former, there is potential for parties to rebut a 
presumption of illegality, and we believe that the potential for 
rebuttal should be given more serious consideration, either 
because there is no possible restriction of competition (that is, 
no infringement under article 101(1) TFEU) or because there 
are countervailing consumer benefits (that is, exemption under 
article 101(3) TFEU).64 
In order to facilitate rebuttal where appropriate, we would 
also argue that the authority should set out one or more 
“theories of harm.” These would not need to be “proven”—this 
 
64. TFEU, supra note6, art. 101(1), 101(3), 2008 O.J. C 115, at 88–89. In this light, 
we are pleased to note that there have been changes proposed to European Commission 
regulations that stress the importance of efficiency arguments in the context of article 
101(3). See, e.g., Commission Regulation on the Application of Article 81(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Categories of Vertical Agreements 
and Concerted Practices, No. 330/2010, pmbl., 2010 O.J. L 102/1 (acknowledging that 
“[v]ertical agreements of the category defined in this Regulation can improve economic 
efficiency within a chain of production or distribution by facilitating better coordination 
between the participating undertakings; in particular, they can lead to a reduction in the 
transaction and distribution costs of the parties and to an optimization of their sales and 
investment levels.”). 
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change should not be seen as moving to the “effect” box via the 
back door—but merely “plausible.” That is, they would need to 
be consistent with the facts, including the market circumstances 
in which RPM had been applied. 
In order to preserve legal certainty, we would propose that 
the hurdle for rebuttal should be fairly high. For example, it 
would not be enough for a party to state that “the authority has 
not proven that this instance of RPM was likely to have a harmful 
effect.” Rather, the burden would be on the party to demonstrate 
that “this instance of RPM could not possibly have been expected 
to have a harmful effect, as evidenced by the fact that the 
authority cannot come up with a theory of harm which is 
consistent with the known facts.” 
B. Use of Screens for Prioritizing RPM Cases 
The second step we propose is a series of screens to consider 
whether there is likely to be a credible theory of harm in any 
particular case of RPM, and to prioritize cases on this basis. 
Returning to the earlier discussion of the existing economic 
literature in this area, we have attempted to identify three 
relatively simple screens, at least one of which would need to 
hold in order for there to be the possibility of a credible theory 
of harm associated with the RPM: 
First, is there unilateral market power or concentration 
upstream? Without upstream market power there is unlikely to 
be a theory of harm associated with protecting that market 
power, nor is there likely to be a strong theory of facilitating 
upstream coordination if the upstream market is fragmented. 
Second, is there significant downstream buyer power or 
concentration? If there is no downstream buyer power or 
concentration, then there is unlikely to be a strong theory of 
harm regarding RPM facilitating downstream coordination or 
deliberately foreclosing downstream entry. We note that this 
screen could be further strengthened by evidence that the 
manufacturer, rather than the retailer, instigated the RPM. 
Third, and finally, are there networks of RPM agreements 
involving a number of upstream suppliers who account for a 
significant share of the upstream market? If not, there is unlikely 
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to be a theory of harm regarding RPM as a vehicle for facilitating 
upstream market coordination. 
If none of these three elements hold in a particular case, 
there is unlikely to be a credible theory of harm, and therefore 
the case would not be prioritized.  
We recognize that there is room for further study in this 
area. For example, how exactly does one define concentration? 
Indeed, a more definitive view on screens may require further 
developments in the economic literature. Nevertheless, we see 
real potential for the use of screens by competition authorities 
for purposes of case prioritization. 
C. Use of Screens Within a Legal Standard 
The final step discussed in this section is perhaps more 
controversial, but we think it is nevertheless worthy of further 
consideration. 
While the use of screens for prioritization of RPM cases may 
have a positive impact in the EU, we recognize that a 
prioritization approach may not be effective in a system such as 
the United States, where competition law is primarily enforced 
via cases initiated by private litigants. However, screens may also 
carry over in helping to define a legal standard. Under this 
approach, the plaintiff would have to demonstrate that at least 
one of the screens was satisfied before the court would take the 
case. Failing every screen could demonstrate that there is no 
credible theory of harm associated with a particular case of RPM 
and, in such circumstances RPM would be viewed as legal. 
We believe that this approach would still leave most 
potential cases of RPM illegal and preserve legal clarity, but it 
would avoid cases—such as Leegin (arguably)—that lack a 
credible theory of harm, and have the potential to bring the 
competition system into disrepute by making it appear out of 
touch with reality. 
There are, however, some noteworthy disadvantages to this 
approach. Some would no doubt argue that blurring the lines of 
“object” infringement will prevent firms from assessing 
themselves, smaller retailers from standing up to powerful 
suppliers attempting to impose RPM, and authorities from 
bringing cases, with the net result being a system that 
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inappropriately resembles a standard “effects” analysis. For us, 
however, a more compelling concern is that the screens outlined 
above not only relate to the practices and position of the parties 
involved in a particular RPM agreement, but it also relates to the 
concentration in the relevant market and whether there is a 
network of similar RPM agreements across the entire market. If 
this approach prevents firms from credibly assessing the legality 
of their own RPM without knowing (possibly secret) information 
about its competitors, then it may prove unworkable. 
Nevertheless, we think a system of screens is worthy of 
further research and study. Moreover, it would have similarities 
to the sorts of screens that are commonly applied in the EU when 
assessing abuse of dominance cases under article 102 of the 
TFEU.65 
CONCLUSION 
Within the current legal framework, there is not yet 
sufficient evidence available to justify moving RPM out of the 
“presumed illegality” or “object” box and into a case-by-case 
“effect” box. However, it is clear that RPM falls far short of more 
extreme anticompetitive behavior such as naked horizontal price-
fixing. In an ideal world, the law would reflect this difference, 
and Part III of this Essay sets out some small steps towards a 
slightly more nuanced approach to assessing RPM. While further 
work is required before these could be fully implemented, we 
believe that these small changes could significantly reduce our 
reservations about the current treatment of RPM, but preserve a 
legal regime in which RPM will, for the most part, remain 
unlawful. 
 
65. See TFEU, supra note 6, art. 102, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 89. 
